It is,I believe,a well-established fact that the cotton industry,espe cially the spinning and weaving segments of it,occupied an impor tant place in Japan's economy before World War II.This was particularly true after it passed through the World War I boom years,2 when it entered its maturity as an industry and supplied cotton cloth in large quantities not only to the domestic market but also to mar kets overseas.
1 This study is a revised summary of the main points(supplemented with several obser vations)I made in my book Nihon ni okeru sanchi men'orimono gyo no tenkai[The devel opment of the producing-center cotton textile industry in Japan](Tokyo University Press, 1989 Now,it is held in academic circles in Japan that small industries such as the producing-center cotton textile industry formed the lower stratum of a dual structure from the1920s on,and that,in stark contrast to the combined spinning-weaving businesses and other such large enterprises that made up the upper stratum,the small indus tries were characterized by low productivity and low wages.3In the 3For the dual structure of the Japanese economy,see Konosuke Odaka,Rodo bunseki[Analysis of the labor market] (Iwanami Shoten,1984) . cotton textile industry in1933 very small businesses of fewer than5 workers made up91.0%of the total of53,642producing premises, with an average total annual output per premise of13,100 yen;in con trast,the figure for the spinning industry,which was made up prin cipally of large enterprises,came to2,116,200yen.Also,the average wages per worker in the cotton textile industry and in the spinning industry,respectively,were212yen and247yen,with a value-added productivity of1011yen and1900yen,respectively.Thus it is true that there was a real gap in wages and productivity between the produc ing-center cotton textile industry and the combined spinning-weav ing businesses.4 Such progress in the producing-center cotton textile industry owed much to the expansion of new markets both domestically and abroad.It would be no exaggeration to say that prior to World War I the industry relied almost exclusively on domestic demand,the only exception being the weaving of narrow white cotton cloth for the Korean market.7Even after the great war the domestic market remained an important basis for the industry's continued existence,but about this time new cotton cloth markets took shape within the country to add to the previous markets.To be specific,because advances in printing techniques made it possible to cut wide cotton cloth into the traditional narrow strips,and because the lifestyles of people in Japan kept moving towards Westernization,the domestic demand for wide cotton cloth-previously hardly ever used within Japan-went on growing.8 later in turning to factories or to power looms than the above centers,and Kojima and Ibara in Okayama Prefecture would pour all their efforts into the production of the single variety of cotton cloth called koku ra(duck cloth),I would be inclined to include them all in this type because they have so many points in common with the above centers.
III.Producing-centers whose alterations in output totals were stag nant in nature,even though they moved to factorization and power looms.Of the27centers that make up the total,9fall into this category.
IV.Producing-centers that were behind in shifting to factories and power looms even into the1930s,where cottage industry or very small manufacture were in an overwhelming majority,where traditional prod ucts for the domestic market such as kasuri(splashed-pattern)or meku rajima(blue-stripe cloth),demand for which went on declining,con tinued to be woven on hand looms and the like ,and whose position as a cotton-textile producing center markedly continued to decline . From figure2it can be seen that producing centers belonging to these two types showed a conspicuous increase in output ,yet the mecha nisms for growth were different for each of them .
1.PRODUCT STRATEGIES
Type II producing centers brought into play an ability to respond quick ly to diverse demand from both domestic and overseas markets and to develop products,and they developed by raising their added value.For example,Banshu,a center that produced narrow striped cotton cloth for the domestic market,was stimulated by the drop of the yen exchange rate after the Great Kanto Earthquake in1923and the activities of industrial laboratories(to be discussed below)to begin serious production of products for export,and throughout the rest of the1920s it specialized in the production of shimamitsuaya(striped drill);then in the1930s it developed and continued increasing its out put of a huge variety of export-oriented dyed cotton cloth for use in things such as sarongs,zephyrs,kikois(loincloths for males in Mombasa, Kenya),saris,and damask tablecloths.Enshu,too,until the 1920s directed its main efforts into the production of narrow striped cotton cloth for the domestic market,but in the1930s it ranked along Banshu in the field of export-oriented dyed cotton cloth. 13 And Yawataharna is also reported to have turned to extensive weav ing of export-oriented dyed cotton cloth.14 In contrast to these three producing centers that switched to export-oriented production,there also were producing centers that pushed forward product development in quick response to changes in domestic demand resulting from a more Westernized lifestyle as well as a raising of lifestyle levels.Higashi-Mikawa,for example, began production of kawariaya(twill and cord)in the boom years of World War I,then in the mid-1920s began weaving flannel and inter woven cloth for children's clothes,to become one of the leading pro ducing centers in the country in each of these three categories.15
Besides the above,there were centers that carried out slightly spe cial product switches of their own.Kojima had been weaving Kokura for sashes and skirts since the late Tokugawa period,as well as sana da(tape)and unsai(cotton drill),but after the Russo-Japanese War it switched to production of taitaitsu for China,and then after the boom of the World War I years and around the time of the1920Panic it switched again to producing kokura for uniforms for elementary and high-school children,and in these areas it ranked with Ibara as a major producing center.16Imabari continued to produce flannel,which had been its main line since the1890s,in large quantities,but in the 1920s it became as renowned as Banshu as a center of shimamitsuaya production,and from the1920s to the1930s it also plunged into the 1067.6%,and in1920a minus268.4%.Obitani,however,was vigor ously trading in futures during the boom period on speculative cot ton yarn,and despite the fact that it suffered a heavy blow from the 1920 Panic,it succeeded in scraping through the Panic by imputing a considerable portion of the losses incurred from trading in cotton yarn futures to cotton-yarn merchants in Osaka City,such as Toyoshima Shoten and Iwata Shoji,from whom it had been purchasing large quantities of cotton yarn.
Anyway,between1922and1925Obitani Shoten abandoned the handling of narrow white cotton cloth for the domestic market and switched to large-scale production of the wide white cotton fabrics of satin and twilled cloth for the export market,repeatedly increasing the number of its wide power looms and continually expanding its scale of operations.The capital needed for equipment investment in the1920s,being in excess of the range of depreciation that occurred in the process of activating export-oriented production,was being sup plied from the large amounts of owned capital;since there was no capital increase during the1922-1925period,and increases in reserve funds were also slow,we can say that the returns from the World War I boom years are what supported a considerable portion of equipment investment in the1920s.The equipment investment that went ahead rapidly from1931was also financed from owned capital (again having exceeded depreciation limits),but,unlike the1920s, the replenishment of internal reserves that accompanied the activa tion of production made such self-financing possible. Though I have not been able to obtain other examples besides Obitani of profits gained during the World War I boom years and reactions to the1920Panic,it is a confirmed fact that most of the compara tively large-scale weavers that belong to Type I were covering equipment investment in the period between the wars with owned capital.18 Associations Law]of1931,and they were able to carry on such oper ations as product inspection,control(concretely,limiting production of designated products),and joint action(such as collective buying of raw materials,building of cooperative processing plants,collective sale of products,and lending of funds to members).
The case of Banshu will help illustrate how things worked.The Nishi waki branch of the Hyogo Prefecture Industrial Laboratory(in1933 this branch became known as the Hyogo Prefecture Nishiwaki Dyeing and Weaving Laboratory)was opened in1921,and within a couple of years it began encouraging the production of export-ori ented cotton cloth.The important stimuli for this course of action were the fall in the yen exchange rate after the Great Kanto Earthquake and the switch by Banshu to becoming an export-oriented producing center.The branch laboratory had hardly been estab lished before it was also pushing for the eradication of slipshod man ufacture,something that had become a serious problem in the early 1920s.In1923,in response to the leap in export-oriented production, it carried out research on the technique of adjusting the operations of wide-cloth looms,and in1925,when the Banshu Ori Seiri Riyo Kumiai [Banshu Woven Goods Sorting and Use Association]was started for the purpose of conducting the sorting that was indispensable for export-oriented cotton cloth,the laboratory was in charge of exper imental research on sorting textiles and practical guidance to pro ducers.In all these endeavors the laboratory achieved excellent results.
For most of the1920s Banshu weavers continued to specialize in the production of shimamitsuaya,but the head of the Nishiwaki branch laboratory from1922,Taro Yoshida(1885 Yoshida( -1938 ,saw this as risky,and from November1929,for over four months,he travelled in Singapore and the Dutch East Indies to investigate the demand there for Banshu fabric,and to collect samples of foreign-made cot ton cloth.After his return he was convinced that the products that would be most desired were striped sarongs,textiles of cotton mixed with rayon,and textiles of rayon,and he urged weavers,through wide distribution of samples,to move into production of these.In the early 1930s the branch laboratory embarked on the development of zephyr and kikoi fabrics.From October1933Yoshida was sent by the prefectural government to travel for three and a half months through Southeast and South Asia and the Middle and Near East:to Singapore,Bangkok,Penang,Rangoon,Calcutta,Madras,Bombay, Aden,Cairo,Suez,Port Said,Alexandria,Izmir,and Istanbul.As a result of this trip,besides collecting samples of textiles,he decided the market in Asia,where import restrictions against Japanese cot ton cloth had become notable,ought to be given up as a lost cause, and he pushed for the cultivation of a variety of new products for mar kets in the Middle and Near East and Africa.Spurred on by Yoshida's firsthand information,Banshu proceeded even further in the direc tion of a product-diversification strategy.Furthermore,the laboratory increased its efforts in technological guidance to weavers in the late 1920s and through the1930s,starting in1928a year-long training course in dyeing and weaving limited to a quota of15males that was con tinued,with reorganizations and expansions,for the rest of the peri od between the wars,and the graduates of these courses were warm ly welcomed by the weaving companies.
Banshu(like many other textile producing centers)had had,by the way,several professional associations existing within its territory from the earliest years of the twentieth century,as a result of prescriptions of the1900Juyo
Bussan Dogyo Kumiai Ho[Important Products Professional Associations Law].These associations carried out prod uct inspection,and,during the1920Panic,a curtailment of opera tions,the lowering of wages,and the submission of requests to the Bank of Japan for financing assistance.Banshu Ori Dogyo Kumiai[Banshu Weavers Association],in particular,was active in the1920s in the employ ment of dyeing specialists,the specification to weavers of dyes,the encouragement of bleachers to use pressurized boiling kiers,the establishment of the first industrial association to run a proper sort ing plant(Yugen Sekinin Banshu Ori Seiri Riyo Kumiai[Banshu Woven Goods Sorting and Use Association,Ltd],the encouragement of weavers to adopt electrical power,and so on.Compared to other textile producing centers it was probably far more active.These types of functions were,however,gradually taken over by some industrial associations established around the year1930.
The biggest project for Banshu's industrial associations in the early years was the shimamitsuaya control put into effect from November1930with the powerful assistance of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.While this project,aimed at large numbers of small and medium-sized weavers throughout the country but espe cially in Banshu,Imabari, Sennan,23and Wakayama,ended in failure, the end result was that businesses connected with Banshu weaving that had been specializing in shimamitsuaya production were willy-nilly placed under the regulation of the industrial associations.During the favor able conditions that obtained after the reembargo on gold export in late1931,the industrial associations used their regulatory powers in energedcally promoting joint operations,and they strengthened the export competitiveness of the Banshu cotton textile industry.The first thing the associations did was to expand the sorting operations under their direct management that they had been carrying out from almost the start of their existence.Banshu Ori Kogyo Kumiai [Banshu Weaving Industry Association],which ran the sorting plant that in1932employed300workers,in that same year closed down the other five businesses engaged in sorting operations within its juris dictional boundaries and took over exclusive control of the opera tions.Other associations also strengthened their roles in the dyeing and bleaching industries.Several of the associations directly managed dyeing and bleaching plants as well,but Banshu Ori Kogyo Kumiai, which did not run these operations,obtained the cooperation of the Nishiwaki Dyeing and Weaving Laboratory in the years1934and 1935to make public the results of tests on the actual costs of the prin cipal dyes,and in this way it was able to check the dyeing businesses that had been making exorbitant profits.This action led to the pur chase of dyes and chemicals on consignment from1935on.And from the same year the Association signed a special agreement with a leading cotton-yarn merchant in Osaka City,Maruei Shoten,and began buy ing from them cotton yarn and rayon yarn as requested by members .
The activities of industrial laboratories and industrial associations can be found throughout most of Type II producing centers.In Imabari,for example,the Ehime Prefecture Training School opened in1922offered a two-year training course in dyeing and weaving for a maximum of40students,as well as short-term in-service training courses aimed at dyers and weavers.In addition,it also provided practical guidance for people in these occupations and conducted experimental research aimed at promoting the production-center . 23Not all of the Sennan region ,but the region from present-day Izumi-Sano City and southwards,which was producing dyed processed cotton cloth and towels for export .
Toshiharu Sugawara(1891 Sugawara( -1958 ,a technician who led the activities of the Training School and later took over as head in1932,was suc cessful in the1920s in producing high-grade towels using dobbies and then Jacquard looms,as a result of which Imabari's towel output increased dramatically.After the Training School was reorganized into the Ehime Prefecture Dyeing and Weaving Laboratory in1934,its significance as a place for nurturing technicians was nearly com pletely lost,but technological research related to towel production continued,and it came to oversee a whole series of Jacquard-related operations such as patterned designs and the manufacture of pattern sheets.It also promoted the development of new products such as rayon textiles.Obtaining information from trading companies in the large cities in regard to demand for export-oriented wide textiles and towels,and information from large-city department stores and the Nippon Taoru Kogyo Kumiai Rengokai[Japan Federation of Towel Industry Associations]in regard to domestic demand for tow els,the Dyeing and Weaving Laboratory produced samples accord ingly and distributed them to dyers and weavers.The Imabari region had Imabari Orimono Kogyo Kumiai,which had been established in 1930to replace the Imabari Orimono Dogyo Kumiai.While there are many points still unclear about this organization,it is known that it owned processing facilities for cotton cloth and towels,and that it gave powerful support,through financial aid,to the activities of the Dyeing and Weaving Laboratory.
In Enshu,also,from before World War I the Shizuoka Prefecture Hamamatsu Industrial Laboratory was responsible for introducing new technology connected with the textile industry,and after the war it continued its activities over a wide area:setting up textile-industry related associations;establishing Eikyfusha,a pioneer manufactur ing-industry association covering important export products;setting up companies to engage in the processing of textiles;conducting mar ket surveys;and developing products. As is clear from the above,then,in the period between the wars industrial laboratories in Type II producing centers were much more than organs for experimental research;they were bases for develop ing new products and sources of a steady supply of technicians.The industrial associations,also,by energetically promoting joint pro jects,were a second indispensable link in the structures of the pro ducing centers.Their various contributions were all services that individual small and medium-sized weavers could not easily provide themselves,and there is no denying that the activities of these labo ratories and associations were strong determinants of the success of Type II producing centers. In Type I producing centers,however,the situation seems to have been just the opposite.The powerful weavers in this type of produc ing center concluded separate contracts with cotton-yarn and cotton cloth merchants and spinning companies that were extremely advan tageous as far as accumulating their own capital was concerned,and by carrying out fearless rationalizations to fit their own circumstances they achieved rapid growth.
Obitani Shoten in Sennan is said to have joined in the mid-1920s
(during the continuing recession)with Ichitaro Ichihashi of Yagi Shoten,eminent cotton cloth merchant in Osaka City,and with Kiyoshi Inoue of Kanegafuchi Boseki(Kanebo),one of the leading giant spinning companies in the country,in a division-of-labor scheme in which Obitani used Kanebo yarn to weave five-shaft satin fabric,which Kanebo then processed in its Yodogawa plant,said to have been the biggest in the East,and which Yagi Shoten then exported to East Asia.In this way Obitani became able to produce and sell large quantities of cotton cloth.In Senboku,Kikusaburo Morita [Morita Shokufu]started a similar scheme around1929;it wove cal ico using yarn from the large spinning company Kureha Boseki,and then exported it through the powerful Osaka trading company Ito Chu Shoji,which had close ties with Kureha(Ito-Chu is said to have sold30%of Morita's cloth,and the cooperation between these three companies is said to have continued beyond World War II days).
Large weavers in both Sennan and Senboku made agreements with certain spinning companies from the middle of the1920s,so that they could have a portion of the spindles of these companies used to make yarn exclusively for their use.What this meant,for example,is that they could have20-count yarn drawn out to21or22count,or even sometimes as much as24count,and while there would be no appreciable difference in the quantity of raw cotton used when they had20-count yarn drawn out to21-count yarn,there would be a sub stantial lowering of the cost to the weavers of the cotton yarn purchased if,for example,they received21meters of yarn instead of the20meters they would ordinarily have received.Internal documents confirm that transactions of this sort did in fact take place in Obitani Shoten in the1930s,but it is said that similar things were done by Nakabayashi Menpu[Nakabayashi Cotton Cloth]and Kawasaki Menpu in Sennan, and Morita Shokufu[Morita Woven Cloth],Kuboso Shokufu,and Otori Shokufu in Senboku as well.When one considers the fact that between the wars the price of cotton yarn accounted for over80%of total expenditure in the production of wide white cotton cloth,it is certain that the acquisition of thinner yarns was a great boost to the growth of the large weavers.
In the1930s Obitani made another strategic move.While the majority of Sennan weavers were weaving wide cotton cloth on power looms either36or44inches wide,Obitani ordered large numbers of specially made power looms34and40inches in width from the Harada-shiki Shokki Kabushiki Kaisha[Harada-type Loom Inc.]and Gomei Kaisha Hirano Seisakujo [Hirano Manufacturing Plant& Co] .By using these,Obitani was able to weave cloth of the same width as the other weavers,but enjoyed the following advantages:1)less elec tric power was used;2)because a row of these looms took up less space, each woman worker was able to look after more looms;and3)each loom cost less.
Similarly,in1929Nakabayashi Menpu became possibly the first pro ducing-center weaver in the nation to use automatic looms(having purchased529from
Enshu Loom Inc.),and in1933Morita Shokufu followed suit with the introduction of more than1,000automatic looms. Now,these various measures were of their nature individual reforms,not things that could be put into place by the common run of small and medium-sized weavers,who would have only limited funds at their disposal.In Type I producing centers the process of competition within the center itself would have enlarged the gaps among the weavers within that center as far as production conditions and oper ating scales were concerned.As a result,in these Type I producing nation.
In summary,it is difficult to find any of those controlling,exploita tive relations between large business as represented by the combined weaving and spinning companies,and the medium-sized businesses in Type I and Type II,and it would seem that the competition in the marketplace between the two groups was not as fierce as the accept ed opinion would have it.It seems that large business gave preferential treatment to medium business as being its biggest customer for cot ton yarn,and refrained from making aggressive inroads into the lat ter's markets.Both groups should be thought of as being in a sym biotic relationship,in which medium business joined with large business to wield stiff competitive power in the world's cotton cloth markets,and this was one of the important factors bringing about the development of Japan's cotton industry in the period between the wars.
Osaka
University
